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Abstract 
Although research on conflict has tended to study interstate conflict and civil war 
separately, states experiencing civil wars are substantially more likely to become 
involved in militarized disputes with other states. Scholars have typically focused on 
opportunistic attacks or diversionary wars to explain this domestic-international conflict 
nexus. Although such opportunistic or diversionary conflicts may occur, we argue that 
international disputes that coincide with civil wars are more often directly tied to the 
issues surrounding the civil war, or are endogenous to the internal conflict itself. We 
argue that intervention, externalization, and unintended spillover effects are important 
sources of international friction. We demonstrate that civil wars significantly increase the 
probability of disputes between states and that this “civil peace” effect is similar in 
magnitude to the well-known “democratic peace” effect. Moreover, an analysis of 
conflict narratives shows that the increased risk of interstate conflict associated with civil 
wars is driven primarily by states’ efforts to affect the outcome of the civil war through 
strategies of intervention and externalization and not by an increase in conflicts over 
unrelated issues.  
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 Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International 
Disputes 
 
In this paper, we describe and analyze an important, but previously neglected, 
relationship between civil and international conflicts. Much of the literature on violent 
conflict treats inter- and intra-state conflict separately, and assumes that the two are 
mutually exclusive phenomena, driven by different factors. In practice, however, we find 
that there are often strong connections between the two types of conflict. For instance, 
recent disputes in Africa between Chad, Sudan, and their respective rebel movements,1 as 
well as the conflict between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, blur 
the distinctions between inter and intra-state conflict. The observation that civil wars and 
interstate conflict often go together underscores the need for systematic analysis of how 
these two types of conflict may be linked. 
The literature on international conflict typically focuses on interactions between 
states and conflicts over the allocation of territory or resources, while ignoring how 
internal violence affects the likelihood of war. To the extent that scholars have focused 
on the civil-international conflict nexus, they tend to assume that this linkage is driven by 
opportunistic attacks or diversionary wars. Opportunism occurs when states attack an 
enemy experiencing internal unrest to take advantage of their rival’s moment of weakness 
(Walt 1996). The diversionary war literature, and related work on democratization and 
war, argues that domestic instability provides the impetus for leaders to engage in 
aggressive foreign policies in order to consolidate control (e.g., Enterline and Gleditsch 
 
1 For an account of the Sudan/Chad conflict involving Darfur, see “Violence beyond Borders: The Human 
Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad”, Human Rights Watch June 2006. 
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2000; Davies 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; for a critique see Chiozza and Goemans 
2003).  
In this paper, we advance a more comprehensive analysis of the connections 
between civil and international conflict and cast doubt on existing arguments. Theories of 
diversion and opportunism suggest that the specific issues and strategies underlying the 
international conflict are exogenous to the civil conflict itself: conflicts are fought over 
‘traditional’ issues such as territory or resources, and domestic instability simply provides 
the ‘spark’ promoting a direct attack at that particular point in time. Although these 
mechanisms are potentially important, we argue that it is more often the case that the 
issues and dynamics surrounding the civil war are central to the international dispute. 
External states may threaten or use military force in support of rebels to affect the 
outcome of civil wars. States experiencing civil war may externalize the conflict, 
directing military force outwards to retaliate against others for supporting rebels and/or to 
conduct cross-border counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the fighting associated 
with civil wars can create unintended security spillovers that give rise to interstate 
tension. 
We present extensive empirical evidence that civil wars dramatically increase the 
risk of militarized conflict between states. This strong correlation between civil wars and 
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) has been largely overlooked in existing analyses of 
international conflict. This effect holds even when controlling for other factors that may 
plausibly influence both civil conflicts and interstate disputes, and is robust to alternative 
indicators of civil war and model specifications. Moreover, the substantive positive effect 
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of a civil war on the likelihood of militarized conflict in a dyad is as large as the negative 
effect of joint democracy.  
In order to disentangle the causal relationships underlying this effect, we use 
newly researched case narratives of over 400 MIDs that coincided with civil wars to 
identify the mechanisms by which civil wars leads to international conflict. This exercise 
shows that most, if not all, of the increase in MIDs associated with civil wars are due to 
externalization of, intervention in, and spillovers from the civil conflict. That is, the 
increased risk of interstate conflict is driven by states’ efforts to affect the outcome of the 
civil war and, to a lesser extent, unintended spillovers from those efforts. We find little 
evidence that the increased risk of MIDs during civil wars can be attributed to 
opportunism or diversion.  
In the following section, we discuss the current literature on interstate conflict, 
emphasizing the lack of attention to the relationship between wars among and within 
states. We then discuss several mechanisms by which conflict within states can give rise 
to interstate tension and disputes, emphasizing the role of externalization, intervention, 
and spillovers, in addition to opportunism and diversion. Next, we present our empirical 
results, which show that civil wars are significantly associated with MIDs, and that this 
result is robust to a number of measures of civil conflict and model specifications. 
Further, we analyze case narratives to uncover causal mechanisms and find that 
international conflicts are not tangential to civil wars— as opportunism and diversion 
suggest — but rather are endogenous to the dynamics of those conflicts. The final section 
offers concluding remarks on directions for future research. 
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Literature review: The neglect of civil war in international conflict studies 
Although the conceptual literature on interstate conflict highlights the role of both 
opportunities to use force well as the willingness to do so (see Most and Starr 1989), 
empirical research has tended to focus more on permissive conditions and constraints on 
the use of force rather than the issues over which conflict may arise. In dyadic analyses, 
distance between states has been consistently shown to decrease the probability of a 
violent interstate dispute (see Bremer 1992; Starr and Most 1976 on opportunity, but also 
Vasquez 1995 on motives). Others argue that overwhelming power preponderance 
decreases the odds of disputes because weaker states are unlikely to challenge much 
stronger opponents (see Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke and Werner 1996).  
Scholarship on the “liberal peace” also emphasizes various constraints on the risk 
of conflict between states (see Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies are argued to be 
less likely to fight one another because democratic institutions, norms, or a combination 
of the two prevents disagreements from escalating to violence (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 1999; Doyle 1986; Schultz 1999). Economic ties between states are argued to 
increase the costs of force or provide alternative means of making costly signals (see 
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001; Russett and Oneal 2001; Schneider, Barbieri and 
Gleditsch 2003). Finally, shared membership in international organizations may limit 
resort to violence (e.g., Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Russett and Oneal 
2001). 
The literature on permissive conditions and/or constraints on the use of force 
tends to “black-box,” or treat as exogenous, the specific issues or motives over which 
conflict may arise. In response to this, a recent and growing literature has sought to 
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examine the issues that may lead to war and their implications for conflict management 
(see, e.g., Diehl 1992). The Issue Correlates of War project led by Hensel and Mitchell 
seeks to examine the issues that may lead to disputes between states, focusing on 
territorial, maritime, and river claims.2 Several researchers have looked at distributional 
conflict over territory (e.g., Hensel 2001; Huth 1998; Vasquez and Henehan 2001), and a 
recent special issue of Political Geography was devoted entirely to conflict and 
cooperation over shared rivers and water resources (see Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers 
2006; Mitchell 2006). 
Despite increasing interest in contentious issues leading to conflict between states, 
researchers have focused almost exclusively on interstate claims and the allocation of 
resources. The aforementioned conflicts in the Darfur region and Lebanon, however, 
strongly suggest that issues from the realm of “domestic politics” – such as the treatment 
of minorities, the nature of the regime in power, and conduct during civil war – can 
influence state-to-state relations. This is, moreover, not a phenomenon limited to the 
post-Cold War era. The Vietnam War, for example, originally began as a civil war in the 
South (or Republic of Vietnam) after independence from France, and only later became 
internationalized when the United States sought to influence the outcome.3  
Despite many examples showing clear relationships between civil wars and 
conflict between states, until recently there has been little systematic research on linkages 
between these forms of conflict. A growing body of literature looks at external 
 
2 For a description, see http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html (accessed 29 September 2007). 
3 More specifically, Vietnam is coded as first experiencing an extra-state war from 1945 to 1954, while still 
a French colony (i.e., ES-421). This is later followed by a civil war in the Republic of (South) Vietnam, 
against the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, supported by the Democratic Republic of 
(North) Vietnam (i.e., CW-654). The conflict then becomes re-classified as an interstate war (IS-163) on 
2/7/1965, following the build-up of US troops in South Vietnam. See Gleditsch (2004) for additional 
discussion of this issue and the COW war data more generally.  
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intervention in civil conflicts and how international factors influence civil war duration 
and outcomes (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Gleditsch 2007; Gleditsch and 
Beardsley 2004; Moore 1995; Salehyan 2007; Regan 2000, 2002). But the possibility that 
civil conflicts could be a significant cause of violent interactions between states has 
received much less attention (although see Atzili 2006/7, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2007; 
Salehyan 2008; Chiozza, Gleditsch, and Goemans 2006). To the extent that this issue has 
been addressed, the focus has been on diversionary temptations for elites faced with 
domestic turmoil (e.g., Davies 2002), incomplete regime transitions (e.g., Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005), or how civil unrest promotes opportunistic attacks against weakened states 
(e.g. Walt 1996). As we will argue below, diversionary and opportunistic incentives do 
not exhaust all possibilities, and are probably not the most important of these 
mechanisms.  
One set of studies that has examined the international effects of civil wars focuses 
exclusively on ethnic conflicts. International disputes may grow out of civil wars when 
ethnic brethren in other states come to the defense of their kin and when irredentist 
claims lead to state-to-state violence (see Carment and James 1995; Davis and Moore 
1997; Saideman 2001; Saideman and Ayers 2000; Trumbore 2003; Woodwell 2004). 
Many civil wars are not ethnic, however, and, as we will see, there are potential causal 
mechanisms other than transnational ethnic linkages whereby civil conflicts may promote 
disputes between states.  
 
How Civil Conflict can Generate Interstate Conflict 
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Why would civil wars give rise to militarized conflict between states? In this section, we 
argue that civil wars can create opportunities for militarization of pre-existing conflicts 
between states, and they can generate new sources of conflict. Arguments about 
opportunism and diversion hold that civil wars provide an ‘excuse,’ or trigger, for an 
attack. Yet, the issues or incompatibilities motivating the attack on opponents are 
unrelated to the civil war itself, and domestic unrest simply provides a convenient 
backdrop. By contrast, externalization, intervention, and spillovers arise when states have 
conflicting preferences about the issues at stake in the civil war and use military force to 
influence the outcome of the war. 
 
Opportunism and Diversion 
Civil wars can increase the risk of interstate violence by lowering the expected costs or 
increasing the expected benefits of using military force. Civil wars and insurgencies 
expose and exacerbate weaknesses in the state’s military capabilities and divert resources 
away from defense against foreign enemies (see Davies 2002; Walt 1996). This position 
of weakness may invite opportunistic attacks against the state, which would not have 
taken place in the absence of the internal conflict. In such cases, the attacker is not 
concerned with the outcome of the civil war and does not necessarily sympathize with 
rebel aims, but is primarily motivated by capturing territory or resources. The war aims 
are unrelated to the civil conflict and often precede them. For example, Iraq and Iran had 
a long-standing dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and other territorial claims, but 
the Iranian revolution weakened the state and provided a window for Iraq to launch an 
attack. 
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Civil wars and internal unrest could also encourage diversionary behavior as 
leaders seek to draw attention away from domestic problems, invoke a “rally round the 
flag” effect, or scapegoat foreigners (e.g., Davies 2002). As before, the issue at stake in 
the external conflict can be independent of the internal unrest, as leaders pick 
diversionary targets and use foreign adventures as a way to silence dissent. For instance, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody border war over a seemingly insignificant piece of 
territory in the Badme region in 1998. Although there was little economic or strategic 
value for this disputed territory, both governments used the international conflict as a 
pretext to crack down on domestic opponents and to undermine nascent democratic 
institutions (see Amnesty International 1999).  
The literature on democratization and war suggests similar dynamics. In this 
view, regime transitions, unstable political coalitions, and contests for power prompt 
elites to engage in aggressive foreign policy actions in order to consolidate control and 
eliminate rivals. International conflicts and external threats provide the necessary milieu 
for clamping down on dissident factions. As Mansfield and Snyder (1995: 7) write, 
“…war can result from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay 
astride their unmanageable political coalitions.”  
From an empirical perspective, opportunism and diversion have different 
implications for who initiates the attack. Opportunism suggests that states undergoing 
civil war will be more likely to be attacked while diversion implies the opposite. 
Nonetheless, in both cases the stated goals in the military dispute will be separate from 
the civil war itself. Although internal unrest triggers the international conflict, the aims of 
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states are exogenous to the civil war and may include ‘traditional’ factors such as the 
allocation of territory.  
 
Intervention 
An alternative possibility is that civil wars generate new issues of contention between 
states and new opportunities for using military power. The basic ingredient here is that 
states may have different preferences over the outcome of the civil war. The state 
afflicted by the civil war obviously wants to defeat the rebels. Interstate conflicts can 
arise when external states perceive an interest in a rebel victory—or, at a minimum, in the 
prolongation of the civil war. When such an interest exists, these outside states have 
incentives to intervene in support of rebel groups by giving them economic resources, 
arms, external sanctuaries, and, in some cases, direct military support. 
Why might outside states develop such an alignment of interests with rebels in 
another state? In general, there are five broad reasons why foreign states may support 
rebel groups in a civil war: 
• Proxy wars: External actors may support insurgencies in order to weaken 
their international rivals and drain them of resources, which will give them 
a military advantage in their pre-existing rivalry. For example, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea have contested their border since the latter’s independence in 
1993. Both have supported rebel factions in the other state in order to gain 
leverage in this territorial dispute. 
• Regime disputes: External actors may support rebel groups in order to 
remove a government whose regime type may be regarded as odious or 
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whose policies are seen as hostile. For example, various African countries 
supported black nationalist rebels opposed to white minority governments 
in Rhodesia and South Africa. Similarly, during the Cold War, the United 
States supported rebels against communist regimes in Cuba and 
Nicaragua, among others. 
• Irredentism: If the civil conflict involves separatist aims, outside states 
may support the rebels in order to join the disputed territory to their own. 
For example, Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri militants stems from that 
country’s claim on the Indian-held territory. Similarly, Serbia supported 
Serb separatists in Croatia and Bosnia in order to further its aim of 
creating a “Greater Serbia.” 
• Protection of ethnic kin: Interventions are often motivated by ethnic 
kinship ties between foreign governments and rebel groups. Such ties 
often explain why external actors might seek government change or 
support separatist movements. In addition, external actors may support 
rebels in order to protect ethnic kin from oppression. Efforts to protect 
ethnic kin will often go together with irredentism, but this need not be the 
case. For example, the Sri Lankan offensive against the Tamil Tigers in 
1987 generated popular demands for government action in the mainly 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu (literally “Land of the Tamils”). Conflict 
ensued when Indian efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Tamils in the 
conflict were intercepted by the Singhalese navy (MID 2778).  
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• Tit-for-tat: One state’s support for rebels can lead to retaliation in kind. 
For example, the Sudan has supported the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda primarily in response to Uganda’s support for rebel groups in 
southern Sudan.  
These categories are obviously not mutually exclusive, and some conflicts have elements 
of more than one. 
As this list suggests, the tensions that underlie intervention in civil wars may, in 
some cases, precede those wars. Indeed, in some instances, civil wars are made possible 
by the support that outside actors are willing to give nascent rebel groups. For example, it 
is unlikely that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) would have been able to start a 
civil war in Sierra Leone without the assistance it received from Liberia. Hence, civil 
wars may or may not cause the underlying conflicts of interest between states. But, civil 
wars do create a new possibility for outside states to use military force in support of their 
objectives. Rather than using the civil conflict as a convenient opportunity to attack, 
intervention occurs when countries lend support to a combatant faction in an effort to 
boost its chances of victory. Thus, this strategy arises directly from, and seeks to alter, the 
dynamics of the civil war. 
Intervention takes various forms, not all of which involve interstate military 
action. States can choose to delegate part of their conflict behavior vis-à-vis foreign rivals 
to rebel organizations, substituting rebel patronage for direct international confrontations. 
For instance, Liberian armed forces never attacked Sierra Leone, but rather used the RUF 
as an alternative to the direct use of force. In other cases, external military invasion 
coincides with rebel support. For example, Libya had been supporting rebels in Chad 
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from the mid-1960s, and its involvement escalated to direct intervention in the late 1970s 
when Libyan troops joined rebel campaigns. In such cases, direct intervention by a state’s 
military complements other kinds of support to rebel groups. Rebels can provide 
information and expertise about the local population and terrain that states lack and can 
serve a legitimating role by giving a domestic ‘face’ to the operation. 
 
Externalization 
As a further direct linkage, governments engaged in civil wars initiate military action 
against neighboring states, a phenomenon we call “externalization.” Externalization 
occurs for at least two reasons. First, governments engaged in civil wars may undertake 
cross-border counterinsurgency actions. Rebels often seek out foreign sanctuaries or 
attempt to flee repression by slipping across borders (Salehyan 2007). In many cases, 
these external rebel bases may be welcomed and supported by foreign actors; in other 
cases, rebels may be able to flee to and/or operate from foreign soil simply because the 
host state is unable to control its borders. In either event, rebels located on another state’s 
territory provoke strikes on external rebel positions and/or “hot pursuit” raids across the 
frontier. For example, Myanmar has on many occasions pursued rebels from the Karen 
National Liberation Army across the border into Thailand, in some cases clashing with 
Thai troops. Similarly, Morocco frequently engaged in hot pursuit raids against Polisario 
rebels in Western Sahara who sought sanctuary in Algeria and Mauritania. These 
incursions are sometimes accidental, as borders may be poorly demarcated, but they 
nonetheless lead to militarization and, in some cases, fatalities of foreign troops and 
nationals. 
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A second form of externalization occurs when states experiencing civil wars 
engage in retaliatory attacks against interventionist neighbors in the hope of coercing 
them into withdrawing support (Schultz 2007). For example, Rwanda and Uganda 
attacked the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 in response to Congolese support for 
rebels. Similarly, a great deal of the militarized conflict between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors has taken the form of retaliatory raids intended to raise the costs of hosting 
Palestinian guerillas (Blechman 1972). 
From an observational perspective, externalization and diversion both manifest as 
an increased likelihood of dispute initiation by states experiencing civil wars, so it is 
difficult in practice to distinguish between the two. Nonetheless, as we will show below, 
a reading of actual cases suggests that MIDs initiated by states in civil war often target 
external rebel bases and the states that host them. Although it is possible that these 
attacks are driven in part by efforts to distract attention from domestic woes and/or to 
scapegoat foreign adversaries, the fact that they are directed at rebel targets suggests that 
the processes of externalization plays a major role. Hence, the tendency in the literature 
to infer diversion when states undergoing domestic turmoil initiate disputes (e.g., Davies 
2002) misses the fact these attacks are often rooted in genuine imperatives of counter-
insurgency. 
 
Spillover Effects 
Finally, civil wars can create new tensions due to spillovers from the fighting, such as 
mass refugee migration, damage of cross-border infrastructure, stray fire, and 
environmental impacts. Refugee flows pose particular challenges to neighboring states, 
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since they can be an economic burden and/or a cause of political instability (Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). Such spillovers can become militarized when states close their borders 
and place border troops on heightened alert in order to prevent conflict spillovers. 
Movements of troops towards the border and increases in border fortification constitute 
militarized interstate disputes. For example, Tanzania and Burundi experienced a 
militarized dispute in May 2000, when Tanzania fortified its borders to prevent refugees 
and rebels from crossing with the Burundian army in pursuit.4 In more extreme cases, 
external actors may take military action against the offending state in order to halt the 
spillover. For instance, the United States’ intervention in Haiti in 1993-94 stemmed in 
part from the desire to stem refugee migration out of that country. 
 
The Empirical Relationship between Civil Wars and MIDs 
In this section, we describe and estimate the impact of civil wars on the incidence of 
interstate militarized conflict. In what follows, international conflict data come from the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, more specifically the dyadic version 
produced by Maoz (2005). MIDs are events that involve at least two states in which at 
least one state threatened, displayed, or used military force against the other (see Jones, 
Bremer, and Singer (1996) for further discussion of the definition). Civil wars were 
identified according to three different sources: the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State 
Wars (see Singer and Small 1982), the Uppsala Armed Conflicts Data (ACD, see 
Gleditsch et al. 2002), and the list of civil wars generated by Fearon and Laitin (FL, 
 
4 This is MID 4311. 
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2003).5 These data sources differ in their minimum death threshold for classifying civil 
wars. The COW and FL data both require a minimum death count of 1,000 over the 
course of the conflict.6 Using a high threshold can exclude periods of low-intensity 
conflict that potentially may escalate to larger wars. The Uppsala ACD have a lower 
threshold and include conflicts generating at least 25 deaths per calendar year. All of the 
analyses focus on the period 1946-2001, except for analyses based on the COW data, 
which end in 1997. 
Combining the MID and civil war data reveals that a sizeable portion of 
militarized disputes coincide with a civil war in at least one of the participants. For each 
MID, we determined whether any of the original states in the MID were experiencing a 
civil war on the day the MID started.7 The proportion of MIDs that met this criterion 
varies with the definition of civil war but is, in any event, rather substantial: 19.3% of 
MIDs in the post-1945 period coincided with COW civil wars, 41.1% coincided with 
Fearon/Laitin civil wars, and 51.9% coincided with Uppsala civil conflicts. By contrast, 
the proportion of state years with civil wars is 7.7%, 12.9%, and 15.5%, respectively. 
Clearly, there seems to be a strong association between internal and external conflict. 
 
 
5 Fearon and Laitin include decolonization wars in their list of civil wars. These have been dropped in this 
analysis. Decolonization wars primarily affect great powers (esp. Britain and France), which also are 
involved in large numbers of MIDs, many of which have nothing to do with the colonial conflict. Hence, 
including decolonization wars risks inflating the relationship between MIDs and civil wars. 
6 We note that the COW criteria have changed over the course of the project, and it is not entirely clear how 
they have been applied in the coding (see Gleditsch 2004; Sambanis 2004 for details). The FL data are 
largely based on COW, but they introduce a number of changes, including a 100 deaths per year criterion to 
identify conflict onset and duration.  
7 The different civil war data sets have different levels of precision when it comes to start and end dates. 
The COW data have established start and end dates, so if a MID started in the same year that a civil war 
started or ended, we can determine whether the civil war was ongoing at the time of the MID. For the FL 
data we only have start and end years, so our coding of civil war-related MIDs could include disputes that 
started before or ended after the civil war. The Uppsala ACD data report start dates in some cases to the 
exact day, but not always, while only the end year is explicitly specified. 
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Civil War and the Probability of MID Onset 
To establish this relationship rigorously, we estimate how the existence of a civil war 
influences the probability of a MID onset in a dyad. For these tests, the unit of analysis is 
the dyad-year. Following convention, the sample is restricted to politically relevant 
dyads, where states are either territorially contiguous or at least one is a major power. 
The dependent variable records, for each dyad year, whether a MID started in that year. 
In the analyses presented here, we model all MID onsets regardless of the severity of the 
MID. We have also estimated the model using only MIDs that involved the use of 
military force and MIDs that led to fatalities, and the results were unchanged.8 Since the 
process by which MIDs start may be different from those by which they spread to include 
other states, we code a MID onset in a dyad only if both states were involved from the 
first day of the MID. If the dyad includes a party joining another MID in progress, the 
dependent variable is coded as missing for that year. The dependent variable was also 
coded as missing in dyad years with ongoing MIDs, as we are mainly interested in onset. 
It is common practice to lag values of the independent variable by one year in 
order to ensure that MIDs are not affecting the independent variables. In looking for the 
effects of civil wars on MIDs, there are virtues and drawbacks to lagging the civil war 
indicator. Lagging avoids inflating estimates due to possible reverse causation, which 
would happen if MIDs contribute to new civil wars. The cost is that the estimates will not 
capture MIDs that occurred because of the civil war in its first year. Moreover, MIDs that 
occurred in the year following the end of a civil war would erroneously be counted as 
having been associated with the civil war. Since reverse causation is a more likely 
contaminant of the estimates, the results we report are based on tests in which the civil 
 
8 These results are available from the authors. 
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war indicator is lagged. Tests performed using the contemporaneous indicators yield 
virtually identical estimates. 
Table 1 presents simple cross-tabulations of the frequency of MID onset with the 
civil war indicator. As is evident from these tables, the frequency of a MID onset in dyad-
years associated with civil wars is about twice that of dyad-years without civil wars. This 
result holds regardless of the civil war indicator used. All of the results are statistically 
significant below the 1% level. 
-TABLE 1 HERE- 
We now turn to multivariate analysis where we include a series of standard 
control variables known to influence the risk of a dyadic dispute, which could also 
possibly affect the risk of civil conflicts. Moreover, the multivariate results permit us to 
compare the substantive effect of civil wars with those of other covariates highlighted in 
the literature on international conflict.  
One important covariate that deserves consideration is the regime type of the 
states in the dyad. An enormous literature on the “democratic peace” shows a lower risk 
of military disputes between democracies (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001). Assessing the 
effects of regime type along with the effects of civil war generates some complications, 
since data on regime characteristics tend to be missing for many states embroiled in civil 
wars. More specifically, we find that states experiencing civil wars are 5-10 times more 
likely to have one of the missing data codes in the Polity IV data on regime 
characteristics, indicating either “foreign interruption” (-66), cases of “interregnum” (-
77), or periods of “transition” (-88). There are two standard ways of dealing with such 
cases, neither of which is particularly suitable for this analysis. The first is to drop all 
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cases with irregular values. However, doing so could underestimate the effect of civil 
wars on disputes by excluding many cases where these occur. The other strategy, 
encouraged in the Polity IV release, is to replace these codes by a set of imputations. 
More specifically, Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 15-6) suggest replacing cases of 
interregnum with a Polity score of 0 and then linearly interpolating transition periods.9 
Although linear interpolation is not an unreasonable way to fill in missing data, there is 
no reason to believe that regime transitions take place in this smooth way, particularly 
during civil wars. Moreover, this practice treats as identical a country that gets, say, a 2 
for one year during a transitional period, and a country that has had a stable score of 2 for 
many years. 
To deal with this problem, we create two dummy variables. The first indicates 
whether or not both states in the dyad were democratic, where democracy is indicated by 
a polity score of 6 or higher.10 Observations including any transitional or interregnal 
polities receive a zero on this variable, since at least one of the states is not democratic. A 
second dummy variable then indicates whether either of the states in the dyad was 
experiencing a transition or interregnum at the time. Including this variable serves two 
purposes. First, it allows us to differentiate the non-jointly democratic dyads in which 
both countries had stable polities from those in which at least one country did not have a 
stable polity; the former constitutes the base category in all tests. Second, this method 
 
9 Marshall and Jaggers (2005:16) recommends treating cases of foreign interruption as missing.  
10 Other studies, such as Russett and Oneal (2001), use a continuous measure of joint democracy which 
captures the democracy score of the least democratic state in the dyad. Including such a measure has no 
impact on the results reported here. We use a joint democracy dummy to facilitate the comparison with the 
effect of a civil war, which is also a dummy variable. 
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permits us to compare the effects of civil wars with the effects of other regime 
transitions.11  
Other control variables include12: 
• Territorial contiguity: A dummy variable indicating whether or not the two 
states were territorially contiguous, defined as sharing a land border or 
being separated by no more than 400 miles of water. These data come 
from Stinnett et al. (2002). 
• Colonial contiguity: A dummy variable indicating whether or not the two 
states were territorially contiguous through colonial holdings or dependent 
territories, taken from the COW project’s Colonial/Dependency 
Contiguity data. 
• Ratio of capabilities: Using the COW project’s National Material 
Capability scores, we take the log of the ratio of the stronger state’s 
capabilities over the weaker state’s. A value of zero indicates perfect 
balance, while higher values indicate a greater advantage for the stronger 
side. 
• Alliance portfolio similarity: A variable measuring the similarity of the 
two states’ alliance portfolios using the weighted S-score developed by 
Signorino and Ritter (1999). 
• Trade dependence: The level of trade dependence in the dyad is calculated 
by determining, for each state, the sum of its exports to and imports from 
 
11 In creating both variables, observations for countries not covered by the Polity data and those in which at 
least one state was occupied by a foreign power (polity score of -66) were coded as missing. 
12 With the exception of the trade, GDP, and IGO data, these data were obtained and merged using EUGene 
version 3.1 (see Bennett and Stam 2000).  
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the other, and then dividing by that state’s GDP. Following Russett and 
Oneal (2001), we include the value for the state with the lowest trade 
dependence. Trade data are from Gleditsch (2002). GDP data are from 
Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007). 
• Joint membership in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs): Following 
Russett and Oneal (2001), we include a measure that counts the number of 
IGOs of which both states were members. Data on IGO membership come 
from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2006). 
Finally, in order to control for possible time dependence, we include the number of years 
since the last MID in the dyad or since independence, entered in linear form and as a 
cubic spline (see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Given the available data, the tests cover 
the time period 1948-2000. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of probit models, using each of the three civil war 
codings. The tables report estimates of the marginal effects of a change in each 
independent variable on the probability of MIDs, rather than standard probit coefficients. 
For continuous variables, the estimate shows the partial derivatives with respect to each 
variable, or the predicted change in the probability of a MID for an infinitesimal change 
in the value of that variable, holding all other variables at their sample mean. For dummy 
variables, the estimate shows the change in the predicted probability of a MID associated 
with a change from zero to one on that variable.13 For comparison, we also report the 
predicted probability of a MID at the mean value for all independent variables. Standard 
errors are calculated by clustering on the dyad to correct for possible non-independence 
 
13 These estimates were obtained using the dprobit command in Stata 8.0. Although a constant was included 
in these models, a constant has no marginal effect, so it is not reported in Table 2. Nor do we report 
marginal effects for the time dependence parameters. 
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within dyads. The reported standard errors apply to the marginal effect, but the 
significance tests are based on the underlying coefficients and their standard errors.  
-TABLE 2 HERE- 
Several results stand out in this table. The main result is that dyads in which at 
least one state was experiencing a civil war have a significantly higher probability of a 
MID than do dyads in which neither state was engaged in a civil war. The magnitude of 
this effect is quite large. Depending on the definition of civil war that is used, having a 
civil war in the dyad increases the probability of a MID by 50-80% over the baseline 
predicted probability at the mean of independent variables. Since the semi-parametric 
time variables included in these models can soak up the effect of other independent 
variables that display time dependence, such as civil wars, this should be regarded as a 
conservative estimate. In sum, civil wars have a profound impact on the probability of a 
militarized crisis with another state.  
Furthermore, we find that the substantive positive effect of civil wars on the 
probability of a MID is of roughly comparable magnitude to the negative effect of joint 
democracy, with some variation depending on the civil war indicator. These results point 
to the existence of a “civil peace” effect that is just as pronounced as the much more 
studied “democratic peace.” Substantively, our results imply that a democratic dyad 
could “lose” the reduction in interstate conflict from their democratic institutions implied 
by the model if one of the states experiences a civil war. Civil wars may be less common 
in democracies, but examples such as Northern Ireland and civil wars in India underscore 
how democracies are not immune to civil war, and many “third wave” democracies may 
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have a substantial risk of violent domestic conflict due to either irresponsive political 
institutions or low institutional capacity (see Hegre et al 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Moreover, although experiencing a civil war has a pronounced effect on the risk 
of disputes, we find no impact of Polity transitions. The effect of the dummy variable for 
a transitional or interregnal polity is substantively tiny and statistically insignificant. This 
in turn suggests—contra the “dangerous democratization” thesis of Mansfield and Snyder 
(2005), which emphasizes institutional change—that transitions by themselves do not 
promote disputes between states in the absence of civil wars.  
To ensure that our results do not arise from unmeasured features of states/dyads 
that make them susceptible to both civil and international disputes, we estimate a model 
with dyad fixed effects as an additional, and rather stringent, test to assess potential 
unmeasured heterogeneity. This technique controls for any constant features of the dyad 
that would influence its propensity to experience MIDs. Furthermore, it ensures that the 
estimates are driven entirely by cross-temporal variation in the data and not by the cross-
sectional variation. We acknowledge that there has been considerable debate on whether 
a fixed effects estimator is appropriate for international conflict data, given that MIDs are 
discrete and rare events and many independent variables of interest vary little over time 
(see Beck and Katz 2001). We make no claim about the general desirability of this 
estimator. For our purposes, the fixed effects estimator is a conservative way to assess the 
possibility that our above results for civil war are a product of unmeasured cross-
sectional heterogeneity.  
-TABLE 3 HERE- 
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We use a conditional logit model to implement the fixed effects estimation, with 
observations grouped by dyad (Greene 1997, 899-901). Table 3 shows the results14. Not 
surprisingly, some of the independent variables that previously had significant effects no 
longer do so, including joint democracy. The civil war effect, however, remains quite 
strong and robust. This means that, even after taking into account possible heterogeneity 
in the baseline likelihood of MIDs in the dyad, the onset of a civil war leads to a 
pronounced increase in the probability of a MID. Correlations between civil wars and 
MIDs do not appear to stem from some dyads having certain fixed features—such as 
regional, cultural, or historical factors—that lead them to experience both civil and 
international conflicts.15 
 
Civil War and MID Initiation 
We have seen that a civil war in either state in a dyad increases the probability that the 
dyad will experience a MID. But who initiates the MIDs in these cases? Our theoretical 
discussion suggested that direct intervention, opportunistic attacks, and efforts to prevent 
spillovers are initiated by external states. Externalization and diversionary actions are 
initiated by the states undergoing civil wars. To get a sense of how these different 
mechanisms contribute to the increased incidence of MIDs we turn to a model of dispute 
initiation. The unit of analysis in these tests is the directed dyad-year. In this set-up, each 
 
14 The reduction in N reflects the exclusion of cases without variation on the DV. 
15 In alternative models, not shown, we consider the effects of ethnic versus non-ethnic civil wars based on 
the Fearon and Laitin (2003) classification of conflicts. There is a large literature which suggests that 
external states will intervene in a civil war in support of their ethnic kin; therefore, it is possible that our 
results are mainly driven by ethnic conflicts. When separating the data this way, we find that ethnic civil 
wars under some specification may have a larger estimated coefficient than non-ethnic civil wars, but non-
ethnic civil wars continue to be a significant predictor of MIDs and the difference between the estimated 
coefficients is generally not statistically significant. Thus, our results cannot be due solely to ethnic 
conflicts. These additional results are available upon request. 
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state is considered a possible initiator against every other state to which it is politically 
relevant. The dependent variable indicates, for each initiator-target pairing in each year, 
whether or not the state initiated a MID against the target, as before, restricted to 
originating states and onset only. In years in which state A initiates a MID against state B 
(the A-B dyad), we code the dependent variable in the B-A directed dyad as missing. In 
the interests of saving space, we present only those results obtained using the Uppsala 
civil conflict data. Results based on the other civil war indicators are virtually identical 
and are available on request. 
-TABLE 4 HERE- 
Table 4 presents cross-tabulation showing the observed frequency of MID 
initiations as a function of whether there was a civil war in the initiator or in the target. 
As is clear from the table, a civil war in either state in the directed dyad more than 
doubles the observed frequency of a MID initiation. This suggests that the increase in 
MID onsets found earlier is due to a mixture of causal mechanisms: states experiencing 
civil wars are more likely to both initiate against others and be targeted by other states.  
-TABLE 5 HERE- 
Table 5 presents the corresponding multivariate analysis. We present two models, 
namely a probit model with controls for time dependence and a conditional logit model 
with directed dyad fixed effects. In the former, we again report marginal effects evaluated 
at the mean of the independent variables, rather than standard probit coefficients. The 
independent variables are largely the same as before, although we can now control 
separately for the initiator’s and target’s regime type and trade dependence. The 
capability variable in this context measures the initiator’s share of dyadic capabilities.  
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The multivariate analysis confirms what was evident in the cross-tabulations: 
states experiencing civil wars are more likely to initiate MIDs, and they are more likely to 
be targeted by other states. The magnitude of the effects is considerable. The probit 
estimates imply that a civil war in the initiator or target state roughly doubles the 
probability of a MID initiation from the baseline at the mean of the independent 
variables. As before, these effects are comparable in magnitude to the effect of joint 
democracy (which is given by the sum of the coefficients on the three democracy 
indicators). A civil war in the initiator is estimated to have a larger impact on MID 
initiation than a civil war in the target, but the difference is very small. A Wald test for 
the equivalence of these coefficients does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis at 
conventional significance levels (χ2=2.84, p=0.092). Thus, we cannot be confident that 
civil wars in the initiator have a larger effect.  
 
Explaining the Correlation: What Accounts for the Civil War “Surplus”? 
We have so far shown that civil wars are associated with an increase in the probability of 
a MID. What accounts for this increase? As noted earlier, there are two broad 
mechanisms that could generate this association. First, there might be an increase in 
militarized action over issues that are unrelated to the outcome of the civil conflict. In this 
view, civil wars generate incentives to engage in opportunistic or diversionary use of 
force over issues unrelated to, and perhaps even predating, the civil war. A second 
possibility is that civil wars generate interstate conflict due to the efforts of interested 
states to directly influence the course and outcome of the civil war. In this case, 
militarized action results when outside states directly intervene in support of rebels or 
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when afflicted governments strike at neighboring states that are harboring and/or 
supporting rebels. In this section we try to get a sense of how much each of these 
mechanisms contributes to the “surplus” of number of MIDs coinciding with civil wars. 
 
Classifying MIDs 
Doing so required researching the MIDs that coincided with civil wars in order to 
determine whether and how the interstate militarized action related to the civil conflict. 
Using the dyadic MID data, we identified every MID dyad whose onset date occurred 
during a COW civil war in the period 1946-1997. Since all the above tests are based on 
annual data, and because identifying exact start and end dates for civil wars can be 
difficult, we included all MIDs that started in the first or last year of the civil war, even if 
they did not fall within the exact time window of the war as coded by COW. These 
criteria generated a list of 431 MID dyads. We then researched the events that composed 
each of these MIDs. Most of this research relied on electronic data bases, including 
Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, Keesing’s World News Archive, and historical newspapers 
available on ProQuest.16  
Once the events associated with the MID were determined, each was coded 
according to the following typology: 
1. Direct intervention: An outside state uses military force to assist the rebels. 
Military action is directly coordinated with action by the rebels (e.g., troops 
fight alongside rebels) or is clearly in support of the rebellion. 
 
16 We are grateful to Scott Bennett for providing us with the bibliographic information that exists regarding 
the MID data. 
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2. Externalization: The state experiencing civil war uses military force against a 
neighboring state in order to target rebels on the latter’s territory or to end the 
latter’s support for rebels. Externalization included three subtypes: 
• Cross-border counter-insurgency: Military forces of the state 
experiencing civil war attack rebels in a neighboring state.  
• Interstate coercion: An explicit effort by the state experiencing the 
civil war to coerce the neighbor to end support/hosting of rebels.  
• Efforts to deter externalization: In these cases, a state that fears being 
target of externalization take anticipatory action, such as making a 
threat or mobilizing forces on the border, in order to deter an attack. 
3. Spillovers: Military action is an unintended spillover from the civil conflict or 
reflects a neighboring state’s effort to prevent damage from spillovers. 
Military actions intended to target rebels on the state’s own territory 
unintentionally hit the other state.17  
4. Potential Opportunism: An outside state initiates military action that coincides 
with the civil war but does not seem related to the war itself. The action is 
driven by an issue that is separable from the outcome of the civil war (e.g., a 
territorial dispute).  
5. Potential diversion: The state experiencing civil war initiates military action 
that does not seem related to the civil war. The action is driven by an issue 
that is separable from the outcome of the civil war (e.g., a territorial dispute). 
 
17 For example, in August 1988, Angola mistakenly shot down an airplane carrying the president of 
Botswana because it was flying in an area of Angola closed due to rebel activity (MID 2756). These cases 
are different from cross-border counterinsurgency because there was no apparent intention to cross the 
border. 
 29
6. Counter-interventions: Two states become engaged in militarized conflict 
because they are intervening on opposite sides of some third party’s civil war. 
Since these cases only come to our attention if one of the two states is in a 
civil war of its own, we have a very limited number of counter-intervention 
cases. We give them a separate coding since they are not strictly related to the 
civil war in the dyad. 
 
Notice that opportunism and diversion were treated as residual categories that 
capture any MIDs in which the action was unrelated to the civil war. We did not make 
any judgment about whether these events were actually timed to coincide with the civil 
war for opportunistic or diversionary reasons. While, say, the Iran-Iraq War was 
plausibly an opportunistic attempt to exploit the Iranian revolution, we also code as 
opportunism or diversion cases that in all likelihood were not influenced by the civil war. 
For example, the 1958 Taiwan crisis coincided with China’s civil war in Tibet; since the 
crisis was unrelated to the issue of the civil war, we code it as a case of potential 
diversion, even though Chinese leaders probably did not have a diversionary motive in 
mind. The number of MIDs so coded is also inflated by the decision to include in the 
analysis all MIDs that started in the first or last year of the war, whether or not they fell 
within the exact timeframe of the war as identified by COW. Although some of these 
extra MIDs were related to the civil war, most were not. 
Each MID dyad was given a primary coding indicating which category best 
described the militarized action in the case. Because some cases were complex, multi-
dimensional, or ambiguous, we also included secondary codings, when appropriate, to 
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reflect additional or alternative interpretations. Secondary codings were used in 43 cases 
(10%). To measure our confidence in the codings, we also gave each case an 
“uncertainty” score, taking on one of three values: 
• Straightforward: We know enough about the case to be confident in the 
coding.18 
• Missing facts: There are gaps in our knowledge of what exactly happened in 
the MID, and these gaps could affect the coding decision. 
• Ambiguous: Even though we know what happened, the case is complex or 
ambiguous, or we do not know enough about the actors’ intentions to classify 
the MID with great certainty. 
Despite the fact that information about some MIDs was hard to come by, the overall 
distribution of uncertainty scores was promising: 88.2% of cases were straightforward, 
7.2% had important missing facts, and 4.6% were ambiguous. 
Finally, we also made note of MIDs in which the action was related to a non-
COW civil war in the dyad. For example, MID 2150 between Angola and Zaire started in 
August 1977, at a time when Angola was involved in a civil war by COW criteria and 
Zaire was not. In this event, Zaire was invaded by Katangan separatists supported by 
Angolan troops. This MID represents a clear case of intervention by Angola, but the 
Katanga conflict did not meet COW’s civil war criterion (it did, however, meet the 
Fearon/Laitin and Uppsala criteria). Hence, even though the MID was related to a civil 
 
18 Within this category, there were a number of cases that were flagged because the only source for the 
militarized action was the state that was the alleged target of the action. For example, in MID 3059, 
Afghanistan charged that Iranian helicopters had crossed the border in Oct. 1983 in order to support rebels. 
Iran denied that the event happened. Nonetheless, COW coded the action as if it happened as charged by 
Afghanistan. Since we have to rely on the MID data set, we too coded the event as if the Afghan charges 
were accurate, but we flagged all such cases to indicate our concern for the quality of the sourcing. 8% of 
the MID dyads we analyzed were so marked. 
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war in the dyad, it was not, strictly speaking, an intervention in or externalization of the 
COW civil war in the dyad. 
 
Results 
Table 6 presents the distribution of MID types several different ways. The first two 
columns show the breakdown of primary types, first for all MID dyads and then for only 
dyads that were coded as originators of the MID. In the third column, we substituted the 
secondary coding in place of the primary coding for those MIDs that had a secondary 
coding. The fourth column includes only those MID dyads that were coded as being 
straightforward, dropping the cases with missing facts or ambiguity. In each column, the 
top number shows the percentage of dyads which fell into each category, while the 
number in parentheses shows the actual number of cases. 
-TABLE 6 HERE- 
Several results stand out from the table. The main result is that around 40% of the 
MID dyads that coincide with COW civil wars represent interventions in, externalizations 
of, or spillovers from those wars. Externalizations are somewhat more frequent than 
interventions, and both categories are far more common than spillovers. Just under half of 
the MID dyads were coded as cases of opportunism or diversion, with cases of potential 
diversion being the single largest category. The remaining 9% involved counter-
interventions in a third party’s civil war or actions related to a non-COW civil war in the 
dyad. Of course, these last two categories do not capture the overall frequency of these 
kinds of events, since they only came to our attention because there happened to be a 
COW civil war in the dyad. The relative frequencies of the different types are essentially 
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unchanged if secondary codings or uncertainty levels are taken into account. The main 
change that occurs when moving from all MID dyads to originator dyads is a decrease in 
the proportion of cases coded as diversion. This reduction is in part caused by the fact 
that China’s participation in the Korean War and Iraq’s participation in the Persian Gulf 
War are coded as potential diversion, and both wars involved a large number of states on 
the target side.19  
The basic result, then, is that cases of intervention, externalization, and spillover 
represent a sizable portion of the MIDs that coincide with civil wars. How much of the 
correlation between civil wars and MIDs does this set of cases account for? Recall that, in 
Table 1, we found that the annual rate of MID onsets in dyads without a COW civil war 
was 2.1%, while the annual rate of MID onsets in dyad with a COW civil war was 4.3%, 
or more than double. Another way to interpret this result is that there is a “surplus” of 
MIDs associated with civil wars. If dyads with civil wars experienced MIDs at the same 
average rate as all other dyads, then we would have expected to see about half as many 
MID onsets in these dyads. In other words, the correlation in the table comes from about 
150 surplus MIDs associated with civil wars. Looking at the second column of Table 6, 
we find that there are 156 originator dyads that were coded as intervention, 
externalization, or spillover. Hence, the MID surplus can be entirely accounted for by 
cases of militarized action that flow from the effort of interested states to influence the 
course and outcome of the civil war in the dyad. 
Of course, looking at this table, it is also apparent that there are about 150 MIDs 
that were coded as potential opportunism or diversion because they were about issues 
 
19 It is also worth pointing out that China’s participation in the Korean War came a number of months after 
its COW civil war was coded as ending. 
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unrelated to the civil war. What does the frequency of these cases tell us? Whereas 
intervention, externalization, and spillovers can only happen if there is a civil war, and 
are endogenous to the civil war itself, the conflicts that were coded as potential diversion 
or opportunism could have happened in the absence of the civil war. We can only know if 
diversion or opportunism were actually taking place if these cases arise at an unusually 
high rate relative to the baseline frequency of MIDs in the population. But this is not the 
case. To see this, we recompute Table 1 excluding those MID onsets that were not 
directly related to the COW civil war in the dyad—that is, excluding cases of 
intervention, externalization, or spillover.20 Doing so shows that the residual MID rate 
among dyads with a civil war is just over 2%, which is essentially equivalent to the 
overall MID rate in the population. Put another way, we cannot rule out that MIDs 
unrelated to the civil war in the dyad happen at the same rate as do MIDs in dyads 
without civil wars. Hence, civil wars do not appear to be associated with an increase in 
MIDs about unrelated issues.  
This result does not imply that opportunism and diversion never happen. 
Logically, MIDs not directly about a civil war could come in three types: (1) those that 
would have happened regardless of whether or not there was a civil war in the dyad, (2) 
those that would not have happened in the absence of the civil war, and (3) those that 
would only happen in the absence of the civil war. The second type reflects cases of 
opportunism or diversion, while cases of third type would arise if civil wars generate a 
dampening effect on states’ propensity to initiate militarized action on unrelated issues. 
When there is no civil war, the observed MID rate gives us an estimate of the frequency 
 
20 Cases of counter-intervention and those related to the non-COW civil war in the dyad were included in 
this count, since they are, strictly speaking, not related to the COW civil war in the dyad. 
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of types (1) and (3) combined. When there is a civil war, the rate of unrelated MIDs gives 
us an estimate of the frequency of types (1) and (2) combined. The fact that these two 
rates are roughly equal tells us that the frequency of types (2) and (3) are roughly equal. 
In other words, opportunism and diversion may be generating additional MIDs during 
civil wars, but, if so, that surplus is offset by an equal and opposite dampening effect.  
All of this suggests that civil wars lead to an increase in interstate violence 
through the efforts of states to influence the outcome of the war (and unintended 
spillovers there from), and not, on net, by increasing incentives to engage in militarized 
action on other issues. 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown that civil wars exert a strong influence on the risk of inter-state conflict 
and suggested a number of plausible ways by which civil conflicts could give rise to 
disputes between states. Further work needs to be done to discriminate between these 
different causal pathways and assess the influence of each, and new data collection 
efforts should be devoted to this end. For instance, Salehyan (2008) uses data on external 
rebel bases to show how transnational rebels operating from foreign sanctuaries can lead 
to international conflict. Schultz (2007) shows how problems of monitoring and 
enforcement complicate states’ efforts to coerce neighbors into ending rebel support. 
Nonetheless, the analysis here already suggests several important implications for the 
study of interstate conflict. 
First, despite the many contributions that have been made by work exploring 
factors constraining the risk of war, a deeper understanding of the causes of conflict is 
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likely to prove elusive as long as research abstracts away from the issues over which 
conflict may arise. A great deal of research has been done on the prediction of interstate 
conflict, introducing new and more sophisticated techniques (see, e.g., Beck, King and 
Zheng 2000), but these studies have tended to simply adopt the right hand-side variables 
suggested by Oneal and Russett (2001), which do not include any indicators of the 
potential issues motivating war. Efforts to understand the emergence of violent conflict 
can benefit from greater attention to contentious issues and how these are managed. 
Second, although we think that existing studies emphasizing contentious issues in 
international politics are on the right track, we believe they have paid too much attention 
to issues of an international character (e.g., shared resources and boundaries) and 
neglected issues within states. We have shown considerable evidence that states 
experiencing civil wars are more likely to become involved in disputes with other states, 
and we have discussed plausible pathways that may link civil war and militarized 
interstate disputes. Research on interstate conflict must recognize that issues often 
thought of as “domestic” can give rise to interstate disputes. These domestic factors 
certainly include civil wars, but other domestic sources of international conflict should 
also be examined.  
Third, our results suggest that the literature on opportunism and diversion—while 
important—has overstated the impact of these factors on the probability of international 
conflict. This work assumes that states’ primary issues of contention are exogenous to 
civil conflicts and that the direct use of force is the predominant strategy that states use to 
attack their opponents. Instead, we have argued that civil wars are central to the 
motivations and strategies behind international disputes. Civil wars provide new sources 
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of interstate tension, and support for rebel organizations can complement or substitute for 
the direct use of force between states.  
Moreover, these findings have important policy implications. Our results suggest 
that international efforts to end civil wars have a multiplier effect on international 
stability. Indeed, from the perspective of reducing international conflict, resolving a civil 
war can have a bigger impact than bringing democracy to an authoritarian state because 
the democratic peace effect is contingent—that is, it only holds in relations with other 
democracies—whereas the ‘civil peace’ effect is universal. These results also suggest that 
democracy promotion efforts need to proceed with caution: to the extent that these efforts 
seek to remove or destabilize existing authoritarian regimes, they risk unleashing civil 
conflicts and increase the incidence of international conflict. If an effort to further the 
democratic peace instead plunged a country into civil war, the result could be exactly the 
opposite of what was intended. 
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Table 1. Civil Wars and MID Onsets in Politically Relevant Dyad Years, 1946-2001 
 
COW Civil Wars 
 Civil War in Dyad No Civil War in Dyad 
 
MID Onset 
 
286 
 (4.3%) 
910 
 (2.1%) 
 
No MID Onset 
 
6,412 
 (95.7%) 
43,103 
 (97.9%) 
  χ2=122.4** 
   
Uppsala Civil Wars 
 Civil War in Dyad No Civil War in Dyad 
 
MID Onset 
 
684 
 (4.0%) 
613 
 (1.6%) 
 
No MID Onset 
 
16,516 
 (96.0%) 
38,114 
 (98.4%) 
  χ2=301.3** 
   
Fearon-Laitin Civil Wars 
 Civil War in Dyad No Civil War in Dyad 
 
MID Onset 
 
531 
 (3.1%) 
766 
 (2.0%) 
 
No MID Onset 
 
16,509 
 (96.9%) 
38,121 
 (98.0%) 
  χ2=68.7** 
 
** Significant at 1%  
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Table 2. Probit Model of MID Onset, 1948-2000 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 COW Uppsala Fearon-Laitin 
Civil War in dyad 0.0047 0.0062 0.0038 
  (0.0014)**  (0.0010)**  (0.0010)** 
Democratic dyad -0.0060 -0.0057 -0.0062 
  (0.0009)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0009)** 
Transitional regime in dyad -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0014 
  (0.0014)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) 
Contiguity 0.0206 0.0202 0.0201 
  (0.0024)**  (0.0023)**  (0.0023)** 
Colonial Contiguity 0.012 0.011 0.011 
  (0.0034)**  (0.0030)**  (0.0031)** 
Ln (Capability ratio) -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0017 
  (0.0003)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0003)** 
Alliance S-score -0.0071 -0.0078 -0.0074 
  (0.0017)**  (0.0015)**  (0.0016)** 
Low Trade Dependence -0.083 -0.067 -0.077 
  (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.047) 
Shared IGOs 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Probability at x  0.0075 0.0071 0.0073 
Observations 44,491 48,766 48,766 
χ2 1126.59** 1210.63** 1183.44** 
Note: Entries show the marginal change in the probability of a MID onset as a function of 
an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, for continuous variables, and a 
discrete change for dichotomous variables. This change is evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables, x . Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
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Table 3. Conditional, Fixed Effects Logit Model of MID Onset 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 COW Uppsala Fearon-Laitin 
Civil War in dyad 0.49 0.64 0.62 
  (0.10)**  (0.093)**  (0.092)** 
Democratic dyad -0.23 -0.29 -0.34 
  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.17)* 
Transitional regime in dyad -0.23 -0.18 -0.26 
  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Contiguity 0.69 0.45 0.49 
  (0.70)  (0.59)  (0.60) 
Colonial Contiguity 1.75 1.87 1.96 
  (0.27)**  (0.27)**  (0.27)** 
Ln (Capability ratio) -0.45 -0.40 -0.42 
  (0.10)**  (0.095)**  (0.095)** 
Alliance S-score -0.62 -0.52 -0.50 
  (0.27)*  (0.25)*  (0.26)* 
Low Trade Dependence 7.38 6.98 4.67 
  (7.54)  (6.78)  (6.82) 
Shared IGOs -0.0079 -0.0072 -0.0070 
  (0.0047)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Observations 11,339 12,750 12,750 
χ2 89.40** 122.60** 119.11** 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 4. The Effect of Civil Wars on MID Initiations: Bivariate Analysis 
 
Civil War in Potential Initiator 
 Civil War in Initiator No Civil War in Initiator 
 
MID Initiation 
 
455 
 (2.4%) 
894 
 (1.0%) 
 
No MID Initiation 
 
18,198 
 (97.6%) 
90,336 
 (99.0%) 
  χ2=272.0** 
   
Civil War in Potential Target 
 Civil War in Target No Civil War in Target 
 
MID Initiation 
 
391 
 (2.1%) 
958 
 (1.0%) 
 
No MID Initiation 
 
18,197 
 (97.9%) 
90,337 
 (99.0%) 
  χ2=141.5** 
 
** Significant at 1% level 
 46
Table 5. The Effect of Civil Wars on MID Initiations: Multivariate Analysis 
 
  (1)  (2) 
 Probit with time Conditional Logit 
Civil war in initiator 0.0034 0.64 
 (0.0006)**  (0.097)** 
Civil war in Target 0.0020 0.49 
 (0.0006)**  (0.10)** 
Democratic Initiator -0.0001 0.20 
 (0.0006)  (0.16) 
Democratic Target 0.0020 0.30 
 (0.0007)**  (0.15) 
Both Democratic -0.0037 -0.61 
 (0.0005)**  (0.22)** 
Transitional Initiator -0.0013 -0.20 
 (0.0007)  (0.21) 
Transitional Target -0.0000 -0.089 
 (0.0010)  (0.19) 
Both Transitional 0.0066 0.12 
 (0.0073)  (0.63) 
Direct Contiguity 0.013 0.99 
 (0.0014)**  (0.56) 
Colonial Contiguity 0.0039 1.80 
 (0.0015)*  (0.26)** 
Capability Share 0.0029 0.57 
 (0.0005)**  (0.62) 
Alliance S-score -0.0035 -0.28 
 (0.0010)**  (0.25) 
Initiator’s Trade Dep. 0.0003 -0.44 
 (0.0013)  (1.66) 
Target’s Trade Dep. -0.0081 -3.14 
 (0.0042)  (1.54)* 
Shared IGOs 0.0001 -0.0030 
 (0.0000)**  (0.0040) 
   
Probability at x  0.0035  
Observations 92,200 16,098 
χ2 1185.24** 133.66** 
 
Note: Entries in columns (1) and (2) show the marginal change in the probability of a 
MID onset as a function of an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, for 
continuous variables, and a discrete change for dichotomous variables. This change is 
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables, x . In columns (1) and (2), standard 
errors are corrected for clustering within dyad. In column (2), coefficient on time 
variables not reported. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 6. The Distribution of MID Types 
 Primary Type 
 All DyadsOriginators
Secondary types 
substituted 
Straightforward 
cases only 
1. Intervention 
 
16.4 
(70) 
14.6 
(49) 
16.4 
(70) 
17.4 
(66) 
2. Externalization 
 
19.7 
(84) 
23.2 
(78) 
18.8 
(80) 
18.7 
(71) 
3. Spillover 
 
7 
(30) 
8.6 
(29) 
7.8 
(33) 
5.5 
(21) 
Subtotal of 1-3 
 
43.1 
(184) 
46.4 
(156) 
43 
(183) 
41.6 
(158) 
4. Potential Opportunism 
 
14.8 
(63) 
16.1 
(54) 
15.5 
(66) 
14.8 
(56) 
5. Potential Diversion 
 
33 
(141) 
28.6 
(96) 
32.6 
(139) 
33.8 
(128) 
Subtotal of 4-5 
 
47.8 
(204) 
44.7 
(150) 
48.1 
(205) 
48.6 
(184) 
6. Counter-Intervention 
 
5.9 
(25) 
4.8 
(16) 
5.9 
(25) 
6.3 
(24) 
7. Related to non-COW 
civil war 
3.3 
(14) 
4.2 
(14) 
3.3 
(14) 
3.4 
(13) 
Subtotal of 6-7 
 
9.2 
(39) 
9 
(30) 
9.2 
(39) 
9.7 
(37) 
 
 
 
